Anticipated Budget Deficits and the Term Structure of Interest Rates by Daniel Valente Dantas & Rudiger Dornbusch
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
ANTICIPATED BUDGET DEFICITS ANDTHE
TERM STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES
Daniel Valente Dantas
Eudiger Dornbusch
Working Paper No. 1518




The research reported here is part of the NBEE's research program
in Economic Fluctuations and project in Government Budget. Any
opinions expressed are those of the authors and not those of the
National Bureau of Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #1518
December 1984
Anticipated Budget Deficits and the
Term Structure of Interest Rates
ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the implications of government deficits inan
overlapping generations consumption loan model with longterm assets. The
only asset in the economy is a real consol issued by the government and
serviced by lunipsum taxes on the young. We explore here the timepath of
short and longterm interest rates following the announcement ofa future,
transitory budget deficit under two alternative assumptions. In one case the
deficit arises from transitory government spending, in the othercase from a
transfer.
We show that a deficit policy ultimately raises longterm interestrates
and lowers consol prices. The exact shape of the path of short—termrates
depends on the source of the deficit and on the savingresponse to interest
rates. In general, though, the term structure will bev-shaped.
The interest of the model resides in the fact that theprices of
longterni assets link the current generations to future disturbances. Because
future disturbances affect future interest rates they affect thecurrent
value of debt outstanding and hence equilibrium short—termrates. The exact
manner in which the disturbances are transmitted to prior periods dependson
the extent to which consumers substitute easily across timeor, on the
contrary, have a strong preference for consumption smoothing.
Daniel Valente Dantas Rudiger Dornbusch
Pundacao Qetulio llargas Department of Economics
EPGE, 100 andar MIT E52-357
190 Praia de Bolafogo Cambridge, MA 02139
Rio de Janiero, I.j. (617)253—3648
BrazilRevised
November 1984
ANTICIPATED BUDGET DEFICITS ANDTHE TERMSTRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES*
Daniel Valente Dantas Rudiger Irnbusch
Fundacao Getulio Vargas Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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This paper investigates the implications of government deficits in an
overlapping generations consumption loan model with longterm assets. The
macroeconomic implications of deficit finance have been studied in a number
of approaches. The results depend sharply on the extent to which generations
are linked or people view their lives as finite or infinite. But they are
also affected by the longevity of assets that links present and future
generations even if there were no other source of overlap. The standard
question is the following: suppose the government reduces taxes today and
finances the resulting budget deficit by debt issue. Future taxes, starting
some periods hence, will be raised to assure the balanced—budget service of
the increased debt. In such a setting are there any effects on private
spending or on asset prices?
Barro (1974) has shown that when generations are linked by bequest
motives the present value of the prospective taxes offsets the current tax
cut leaving spending unchanged and raising saving to build up increased
income with which to service the debt. Thompson (1967) by contrast has
argued that those who enjoy the tax cuts are not those who pay the taxes and
that accordingly a net expansion of demand should be expected at the time of
deficit finance. This same line has been formalized by Blanchard where
finitely lived individuals value current income in excess of corresponding
*Weare indebted to Stanley Fisher for helpful suggestions.2
future taxes because they do not expect to bear the full burden of the taxes.
In such a framework Blanchard (1984a, 1984b). has shown that anticipated
future deficits would lead to an increase in net wealth and hence an increase
in aggregate demand.
In this paper we address the effects of anticipated future deficits in a
closed—economy exchange model with overlapping generations and longterm
assets. Following Dornbusch (1984) the only asset in the economy is a real
consol issued by the government and serviced by lumpsum taxes on the young.
We explore here the time path of short and longterm interest rates following
the announcement of a future, transitory budget deficit under two alternative
assumptions. In one case the deficit arises from transitory government
spending, in the other case from a transfer.
We show that a deficit policy ultimately raises longterm interest rates
and lowers consol prices. The exact shape of the path of shortterm rates
depends on the source of the deficit and on the saving response to interest
rates. In general, though, the term structure will be v—shaped. In the
longrun the increased stock of debt, although serviced by increased taxes,
leads to an increase in the short and longterin interest rate to achieve full
crowding out. The shortterm rate also rises in the period of deficit
finance, independently of the saving response to interest rates and the kind
of deficit,——spending or transfers. But in prior periods the rise in
longterm interest rates reduces the value of debt outstanding and therefore
tends to reduce the shortterm rate required for saving to equal the supply of
debt outstanding. These nearterm results, though, depend on the saving
response to interest rates.
The interest of the model resides in the fact that the prices of
longterm assets link the current generations to future disturbances. Because3
future disturbances affect future interest rates they affect the current
value of debt outstanding and hence equilibrium shortterm rates. The exact
manner in which the disturbances are transmitted to prior periods depends on
the extent to which consumers substitute easily across time or, on the
contrary, have a strong preference for consumption smoothing.
1. The Model
We assume that households live for two periods and allocate consumption
so as to maximize the intertemporal utility function:
(1) U =V(c1)
+
V(c2); V =j—-c1° 0> 0
subject to the budget constraint
(2) C1 + = w—bt
+vt+iat
where
w the given endonent of output
=1/(1+r.)the one period discount factor
the amountoftaxes equal to the number of consols
each of which yields a coupon of one unitofoutput
the present value of transfers received when old
at lifetime disposable income
Maximization of the utility function gives a consumption and a saving
function that depends on disposable income and the shortterrn interest rate:
(3)c1 =
1 A at, s =
1 A at
- ; 41_e)/8
The elasticity of saving with respect to the shortterm rate is positive or
negative depending on the magnitude of elasticity of the marginal utility of
consumption. The elasticity of saving is:
(4) =a(1—1/0)4
where a is the marginal propensity to consume in the firstperiod.
Saving responds positively or negatively to the shortterm interestrate
depending whether the elasticity of marginal utility, e, is smalleror larger
than unity. A case of U close to zero corresponds toextremely easy
intertemporal substitution while a value of 0 tending to infinitycorresponds
to a strong preference for consumption smoothing and henceincome effects
that dominate substitution.
Goods market equilibrium, given a constant populationrequires, that
consumption of the government, g, and the young,c1, plus consumption of the
old equal the available output. Consumption of the old isequal to the
coupon payments plus resale value of their bonds plus transfer receiptsor
v. Thus a goods market equilibrium requires:
(5) w =g+ c1 + (1+p)b +
Vt
where Pt =1/Rtis the price of a consol or the reciprocal of the
longterm interest rates. An alternativeway of stating the equilibrium
condition, using (5), is the following:
(5a) s(a,q) =g+ ptb + Vt
where saving, s, is defined as current income,w_bt, less current
consumption.
The model is completed by an arbitrage equation thatlinks current and
next period's consol prices via the shortterm interestrate:
(6) Pt = +
Using (5), the first order conditions qV'(c1) = V'(c2)and (6) we can state





Figure1 shows the steady state of the model for the case of zero
transfers or government spending. In the steady state short and longterm
interest rates are equal and hence Pt1/Rt =l/rt.
Therefore we can plot
the value of the stock of consols outstanding as a function of the shortterm
rate. The downward sloping schedule thus represents the value of consols
given a fixed number b. The saving schedule which depends on the shortterm
rate is shown upward sloping, representing the case where saving responds
positively to the interest rate. As noted above, this case arises when 6 < 1
so that substitution effects dominate the income effect. In the borderline
logarithmic case the saving schedule is vertical and when 6 > 1 it is
negatively sloped, though steeper than the schedule showing the value of
consols.1
Comparative Steady States: The model can be applied now to determine the
steady state effects of an increase in government debt. At this stage we do
not ask how the debt was introduced but rather look at the longrun effects of
higher debt, matched by increased taxation of the young to service the debt.
In terms of Figure 1 an increase in debt shifts the value—of—debt
schedule out and to the right. The saving schedule shifts left since the
imposition of taxes reduces life—time income and hence lowers both
consumption and saving. The steady state interest rate unambiguously rises,
whatever the response of saving to the interest rate. The increase in the
interest rate and the fall in bond prices is larger the lower the elasticity
of the marginal utility of consumption.
1From (4) above the maximum value of the saving response is ci. as 0 tends to
infinity. Thus the saving schedule must be steeper than the schedule showing






Prom (6a), using the definition of the saving eleasticity in (4) we
derive the steady state effect of increased debt, serviced by luinpsuin taxes





where adenotes a percentage change and a bar denotes a steady state value.
Note that the denominator of (8) is always positive. Therefore an increase
in debt must reduce the value of debt outstanding, pb, unless the saving
elesticity, ,issufficiently negative. Only when consumers show little
preference for consumption smoothing, so that intertemporalsubstitution is
high, can an increase in debt lead to an increased value of debt outstanding.
Otherwise the rise in longterm interest rates depresses asset prices out of
proportion with the increase in the number of consols outstanding.
These longrun effects of an increase in debt, with debt service financed
by increased taxation, are part of the adjustment to transitory deficits.
These are the longrun effects, beyond the deficit. We now turn to the
effects during the period of deficit finance and the period of anticipation.
We split that discussion, starting with the case of a current deficit,
financed by debt issue.
2. Current Deficits: Consider now a situation where the government during
the current period effects an unanticipated transfer, or an unanticipated
goernment expenditure. Debtfinancecovers the deficit. At the same time it
is announced that taxes, starting next period lumpsum taxes will be
permanentlyincreased by an amountsufficientto match the higher coupon
payments associated with the once and for all increase in debt.7
A current transfer accruing to the old raises their consumption by the
full amount of the transfer. The current young are not directly affected by
the measure because they neither receive transfers now nor pay taxes next
period. The goods and capital market equilibrium is also affected by the
prospect of lower bond prices in period t+1. We already saw above that the
steady state price of bonds will decline in response to higher debt. That
decline will spill—over to some extent to the current period. This must be
the case because consol prices today and next period are linked by an
arbitrage equation using the shortterm rate. Equation (6) above implies that
an increase in future consol prices, given the current shortterm rate, must
lower also the current consol price. This longrun implication of debt
finance thus tends to depress present consol prices thereby partly offsetting
the increased purchasing power of the old due to the transfer.
The solution is given by the equilibrium conditions in todays capital
market and in the market next period which is also the new steady state.2
Using (6) and denoting a steady state value by a bar, they are respectively:
fr\ L 1(4 — -- - -- — — LI —L w — i) -r — )tL)-r
Vt Vt — =u-r
(io)s(w
—, /(t+)) =
whereb' is the number of bonds the government sells, the proceeds being
distributed as a transfer to the old, i.e. v. =ptb'.We already saw in (8)
the effect on the steady state price p. Using that result we obtain from (9)
the impact on the current consol price:
21n Dornbusch (1q84) it is shown that given debt and income the only
perfect foresight path consistent with the budget constraint is an immediate
move to the steady state.a
A — 1+(i+
(ii)Pt =(i- - 8(1-q)j
b
Equation (ii) shows the effect on consol prices: Specifically if saving
responds positively to the interest rate the consol price will fall already
today or, equivalently, the longterin rate rises immediately. But if 8 is
positive this is also the case. Note that in the extreme case of no
substitution 8 =so that the consol price will fall if (l +gb/a)< 1.
This condition is satisfied and hence, whatever the saving response, current
debt financed deficits must cause the present consol price to fall or
longterm rates to rise.3
In the same way we can show that the shortterm interest rate must
already rise during the period of deficit finance, whatever the saving
response. Only in the extreme case of no intertemporal substitutiondoes the
shortterni rate remain unchanged. Equation (12) shows the these results.
(12) rt =b(a-8)/(1-8)[i-8(i-q)]
We now have shown that present transfer payments financed by debt, with
increased debt service financed by higher taxes starting next period must
raise interest rates both in the longrun and during the period of deficit
finance. This holds for short andlongtermrates independent of the saving
response. Furthermore, the same result holds if instead of transfer payment
we had considered a transitory, current government spending. This
is apparent from equation (9) where in place of vt we would have =pb'.
3We can write the inequality as a(1+qb/a) < 1 orgb/a < 1— pb/a. Since
is a fraction and gb/a is less than pb/a the condition must be
satisfied.
8 is at most equal to a in the case of no intertemporal substitution. The
equation is derived by noting that in equilibrium pb/a is egual to the
savings ratio and hence pb/a =1—a.9
Therefore we can generalize to state that unanticipated, transitory transfers
to the old, or government spending, must raise interest rates as they occur.
Before proceeding to the case of anticipations we offer a brief diagrammatic
explanation of these results.
InFigure 2we show the effect of the current transfer on on the supply
ofsecurities outstanding bytherightward shift of the schedule showing the
valueof consols. The steady state saving schedule shifts left due to
increased taxes. The steady state interest rate therefore rises from r to
r'. Now consider the effect in the preceding period where deficit finance
occurs. Here saving is still given by the initial schedule. But the supply
of debt is now equal to the value q(1+')b, with p'1/r'. Thedashed
schedule shows the value of the increased stock of consols, given ',asa
function of the current shortterm rate. Since the next period price is
given, changes in the shortterm rate have only a minor effect on the value of
debt. Thus the schedule JJ is relatively steep compared to the schedule
showing the value of debt. Of course it must pass through point A' since at
a current short rate equal to the new steady state rate the value of debt
today is equal to what it will be next period.
The current equilibrium is at point A" where saving equals the value of
securities outstanding. The equilibrium corresponds to equation (9) above
with p' determined by (10). In this case the shortterm rate rises less than
the longterm rate and the total value of consols rises. The interpretation
is simply the following: At the initial interest rate r, the value of consols
exceeds saving. To restore capital market equilibrium the shortterm must










shortterna rate must increase from A to A".5
Welfare Implications: Consider next the welfare implications. Welfare of
the old depends only on their current purchasing power b +Ptb.This welfare
of the old must rise if the value of total debt increases as it does in the
case shown in Figure 2. Now note that if saving is unresponsive to the
interest rate we have a borderline case where the value of total assets
remains unchanged so that the old generation derives no benefit from the
transfers because there are offsetting capital losses on their existing
holdings of bonds. If saving responds negatively to the interest rate the old
actually lose since capital losses outweigh the transfers.6
Consider next the impact of deficits on the the generation that is
young. They are net savers and lenders. Accordingly an increase in the
shortterm rate improves their terms of trade and hence increases their
welfare. But whereas the currently young generation must gain there is a
steady state loss in welfare. The increased taxes more than outweigh their
benefits of higher interest rates and thus welfare of future generations
deteriorates.7 A debt—financed transfer thus redistributes welfare from
future generations toward the current young and, perhaps, toward the current
old. The interesting possibility, of course, is that the transfer
receipients lose aridthecurrent young who neither receive transfers nor pay
5The diagram makes it easy to study the case where the current young
generation receives the transfers and future generations pay the taxes to
servive the increased debt.
6To show these results we note that the change in the value of securities
ptb (+ Using(ii) we derive the results in the text.
7See Dornbusch (1984) where this result is demonstrated.11
taxes are the net beneficiaries. This case always obtains when there is
little intertemporal substitutability.
Anticipated Government Spending: We now consider the effects on asset prices
and shortterm interest rates of transitory, future government spending.
Specifically, starting in a steady state it becomes known at time T0 that in
period T4 the government will spend an amount g, financing the spending by
debt issue. The government is assumed to sell an amount b' of consols so
that spending equals g =p4b'.
In period 5 and beyond taxes are increased by
so that henceforth the budget is again balanced at a higher level of debt
service.
The solution for short and longterm interest rates and asset prices is
determined by equations (12). The equations are ordered in the sequence of
solution, starting from the new steady state in period 5tothe initial
period:
(12a) s(w—5,/(1+))= ; =b+b'
(12b) s(w-b,p4/(1+p)) =p4b





where s( )isgiven in (3) above. Note from the equations that deficit
financed spending change equilibrium asset prices prior to the actual
spending. Spending first appears in period 4 and carries over via increased
debt and debt service to the new steady state in (12a). It affects earlier
periods via the impact on asset prices already seen in equations (11)and12
(7). We now consider how anticipations of the debt financed spending change
equilibrium asset prices prior to the actual spending. We start with a
benchmark case where the utility function is logarithmic in which case saving
is unresponsive to the interest rate.
The Logarithmic Case: We saw in equation (ii) that an increase in government
spending (or transfers) lead to a fall in asset prices in the period of
deficit finance. In terms equations (12b) that implies a decline inp4 in
proportion to the increase in debt since 8 =0.Thus we have =—b.With
saving unresponsive to interest rates and no change in debt or the lifetime
income of the young in period 3 the equilibrium consol price in that period
remains unchanged. By equation (6) the unchanged consol price of period 3
and the fall in p4 imply that the shortterm rate in period 3 must fall
sufficiently to offset the lower future consol price. The same unchanged
asset price applies to periods 2, 1, and zero.
We thus obtain a term structure of interest rates defined by the
condition that asset prices in periods 0 to 3 remain unchanged at a common
level P0=P1=P9=P3. Applying equation (6) we find that that the new shortterm






The shortterm rate must turn negative since, as we saw in Figure 2 the
longterm rate in period 4 (the average of r and ') exceeds the initial rate
so that the righthand side of (13) is negative. The manner in which the
spill over is split between short and longterm interest rates depends on the
saving response to the interest rate. In the present extreme case of no
saving response the adjustment falls entirely on the short rate so as to keep
the consol price constant.13
Note next that applying (6) to the equality of consol prices in periods
0 to 3 implies that the shortterm rate in periods 0, 1 and 2 must be equal to
the initial long rate L8 Figure 3 shows the path of shorttertn rates and of
the long rate from the announcement in period 1 to the new steady state.
The logarithmic case serves as an interesting benchmark in showing that
future disturbances, via their effect on asset prices must spill over to
earlier periods. This spill—over determines the welfare effects of the
policy. In the case of logarithmic utility welfare of the generations living
in periods 0 to 2 is unaffected. The young in period 3 lose as the shortterm
rate declines and welfare is transferred from them to the young of period 4
who benefit from the increased shortterni rates since they are lenders.
Crowding out thus takes place at the expense of bond holders at the time of
the government spending, sheltering all previous generations. This is a very
special case resulting from the assumption of a zero saving response as we
shall now see.
Alternative Savings Behavior: Figures 4 and 5 show the time path of interest
rates for an example of positive and negative saving response. The diagrams
show the solutions to equations (12) for particular parameter values with
elasticities of the marginal utility of consumption of 0.5 and 1.5
respectively.
In both Figures 4 and 5 the effects in periods 3 to 5 are qualitatively
the same. The steady state rate increases and that increase spreads to the
periodin which government spending rises. In period 3, at a short rate
r3 =the value of debt outstanding thus has fallen relative to saving. To
8We have P2 =(14-p3)/(1÷r)
=
p3where p3 =i/LThus r =It.The same
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restore capital market equilibrium saving must rise and/or the price of bonds
must rise. Independent of the saving response the shortterm rate in both
cases must fall. But in periods 0, 1 and 2 theinterest rate behavior,
however, differs markedly. We first consider the case of a positive saving
response.
In period 3 the decline in the value of bonds at a shortterm rate
R implies an excess of saving over the value of debt. Hence the
shortterm rate must fall below the initial long rate, raising the value of
debt and discouraging saving. Thus in period 3, with saving lower, the value
of debt also is lower than in the initial stady state. Since the stock of
console has not changed this implies that the longterm rate has risen.
Going to period 2 we apply the same argument: At the initial rate
=the value of debt is reduced andhencethe shortterm rate must fall
below ,thoughless than r3. Once more the argument applies to period 1 and
0. Thus we generate a V-shaped path for the shortterm rate and an upward
trending path of the long rate. For welfare purposes that implies an
immediate loss for the old and a loss for the young up to period 3. They
bear thecosts of increased goverrilnent spending while the young of period 4
are net beneficiaries. In the steady state, as noted above there is a
deterioration of welfare as increased taxes outweigh the benefits of higher
interest rates.
In Figure 5 we look at the case where saving responds negatively to the
interest rate. The period 3 interest rate must fall because the impact of
the short rate on the value of debt exceeds the saving elasticity.9 In the













































































































































case of a positive saving response the fall in the interest rate tends
to reduce saving and thus helps restore equilibrium both on the demand and
supply side of the capital market. Here, by contrast, the fall in the
interest rate raises saving and hence a larger fall in interest rates is
required to achieve balance between saving and the value of debt outstanding.
But note that equilibrium saving in period 3 is higher and so-must
accordingly be the value of debt. That means the short rate has fallen so
much as to lower the period 3 longterm rate and raise consol prices above the
initial sterady state This is the explanation for the oscillating longterm
rate in Figure 5.
going back to period 2 we now have an increased value of debt at a short
rate r2F. Thus there is an excesss supply of debt and the short rate must
rise to reduce saving and the value of debt. With the short rate now above
R, savings is reduced below the initial steady state and thus we have shown
that ther longterm rate must have risen above F. This implies that in period
1 the shortterm rate must fall to equilibrate the capital market.
The welfare consequences in this case are the same as above in periods
3, 4 and in the new steady state. But in prior periods gaining and losing
generations alternate. Figure 5 shows that the highest shortterm rate
prevails in period 2 thus making the young in that period best off.
3. Transfers.
We now turn to the case where in period 4 the government makes a
transfer to the old in the amount v =p4b'
and finances the transfer by
issuing debt. In period 5 and beyond the increased debt will be financed by16
an increase in lumpsum taxes. Figure 6 shows the short and longterm interest
rates for the case where saving responds positively to interest rates and
parameters are the same as in Figure 4. While the general shape of the term
structure is the same there is an important difference in that the minimum
shortterin rate, in this case, prevails in period 2.
The longrun results are identical to those in Figure 4. This must be
the case because in the longrun the two applications are identical:
increased debt and increased taxes to service the debt. Also in period 4 the
applications are identical. In one case there is increased government
spending in the other case increased spending by the old, but the amount of
increased spending v =g=
p4b'
is the same. Accordingly interest rates in
that period, too, are the same as in Figure 4. The difference arises in
period 3. Government spending had been treated as if it did not affect
private welfare. But the transfers discussed now do enter the private
lifetime budget constraint of the young in period 3. They look ahead to a
transfer receipt and hence reduce the saving they would otherwise do.
Accordingly equation (12c) now is modified to include in lifetime income
of the young the present value of the transfers they will receive in period
4. Noting the saving equation in (3) the condition for capital market
equilibrium in period 3 becomes:




In particular we note from (3) that a future transfer reduces saving by the
young by a fraction x/(i +x)of the prospective transfer. This decline in
saving modifies the response of asset prices to the deficit by comparison
with the government spending ease. The analysis is made easy by keeping inD
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mind the spending case, which leaves the analysis unchanged from period 4 on,
and superimposing now the reduction in period 3 saving due to the transfer.
The comparison in Figure 6 reveals that in the transfer case shortterm
rates decline less than in the spending case. Moreover the lowest rate is
reached in period 2, not 3. The explanation is the following. At the rate
r3 of the spendingcase at point A3 in Figure 6 there is now an excess of
debt outstanding over savings because the young who look ahead to transfer
receipts reduce their saving. Accordingly interest rates must rise to clear
the asset market. The interest rate rises to point A to compensate for the
extra effect of anticipated transfers that depress saving.
The higher interest rate in period 3, with the same rates in periods 4
and beyond, imply that the value of existing debt p3b is less than in the
transfer case.Accordingly going back toward period zero shortterm rates of
interest will be lower in period 2, 1 and zero since it only takes smaller
rates of saving to clear the asset market.
The saving response to interest rates affects the relative shortterm
interest rates of the spending and transfer case in periods 0 to 3. We saw
above that with a positive saving response to interest rates the trough of
interest rates occurs in period 2. When saving responds negatively to
interest rates the analysis of Figure 7 applies. Again we show for
comparison the shortterm rate of the spending case. The negative responseof
saving to the interest rate reverses the relative magnitude of interest rate
changes by comparison with Figure 6 as well as the period in which the trough
occurs.
The anticipation of transfers reduces saving in period 3 compared to the
spending case. The resulting excess supply of debt at the shortterm rateof






























eliminate the excess supply of securities.10 The shortterm rate in the
transfer case thus is shown by point A. We also note that in period 3the
longterm rate exceeds the initial steady state so that the value of debt is
below the initial value. This fact implies that in period 2, at the intitial
interest rate, the value of debt falls short of saving. Accordingly the
shortterm interest rate in period 2 must be below the initial-steady state as
shown in Figure 7.
The case of a negative saving response to interest rates arises when
there is a dominant preference for consumption smoothing. Given the
exogeneous income and disturbances this preference implies large
accommodating fluctuations in shortterm interest rates. Moreover these
fluctuations in shortterm rates are sufficently large to even make the
longterm rate oscillate and thus the value of debt. The flubtuations in the
value of debt, in turn, feed back into preceding periods, forcing further,
though dampened, adjustments in shortterm rates to balance the capital
market.
Concluding Remarks: A Limiting Case
An interesting limiting case considers only shortterm assets. Suppose
that the government instead of issuing consols issues one period bonds.
Every period the maturing debt with a face value bt is retired by selling new
debt. The difference between the face value and the market value of new
issues is covered by lump—sum taxes on the young amounting to (1_q)b. The
equilibrium condition in the asset market now is:
10From the capital market equilibrium condition s(q,w)q(l+)b we have
q =z/(l—a)(l—1/6)where z denotes the effect on saving of the second
period transfer. The term z is. negative and the saving elasticity with
respect to q, a(1—1/0) is positive. Therefore we have shown that the
shortterm rate must rise.19
(8) =s(q,w)
In this case where anticipated future deficit finance has no irriinediate
effect on the economy. In the case of government spending there is no effect
on interest rates until period 4, in the case of transfers effects occur
first in period 3 when anticipated transfers reduce saving.
The two limiting cases——the logarithmic case studied above and the
shortterm bond case——show that in the case of finitely lived individuals it
takes both longterrn assets and a saving response to interest rates in order
for future disturbances to affect current asset prices. The longer the
maturity of assets and the lower the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
the more future events affect current prices of assets.20
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